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Marcus Tullius Cicero (106 BC-43 BC), orator, philosopher, statesman and 
man of letters, was one of the major figures of the final days of the 
Roman Republic. Although he reached the office of consul in 63 BC, the 
first of his family to do so, it is however his writings that have been his 
greatest legacy. These are extensive, both in volume and in scope. Of 
greatest interest in the study of Roman law, though, are the published 
versions of the speeches he made before the courts. 
 I first encountered Cicero in 1995, studying his in Verrem (a 
prosecution of Verres, a corrupt governor of Sicily) in the Higher Latin 
class at Kirkcaldy High School. Indeed, this was one of the things that 
nudged me in the direction of applying to study law. I was surprised and 
disappointed, then, soon after arriving at Edinburgh in 1997, to be told by 
a friend who had preceded me in the Civil Law class that Cicero was not 
considered to be a lawyer at all. 
 Such, at any rate, is the traditional view, albeit simplified. Any 
introductory textbook on Roman law will explain to students that a 
distinction is made between jurists, who had the function of advising on 
the law, and orators or advocates, who actually appeared before the 
courts and pled cases. This distinction is strongly urged by Alan Watson in 
his “Cicero the Outsider”, an appendix to his book The Spirit of Roman 
Law. Here we are told that in “almost every particular [Cicero’s] attitude is 
the reverse of that of the jurists” (p. 195). Although he himself was 
learned in the law, he dismisses jurists’ expertise as unworthy of serious 
attention, except possibly as a means of staving off loneliness in old age, 
and the jurists themselves as concerned with trivialities. Watson perhaps 
does not sufficiently stress that a comment made by a Roman advocate in 
pleading a case may have a rhetorical function of discrediting an opponent 
rather than representing a genuine expression of opinion. This is a 
standard part of the advocate’s method, and Cicero’s comments in pro 
Murena on the triviality of legal learning (see especially pro Murena 10.23-
25, a defence of a politician accused of bribery by a defeated opponent) 
must be read in that light, given that they were directed at his opponent, 
the jurist Servius Sulpicius Rufus. As Matthijs Wibier observes in the book 
under review (at p. 117): 
 
“That orators and jurists felt the need to engage in such polemics 
[about the superiority of their respective fields], however, suggests 
that they were talking to each other to some extent, and that the 
boundaries between the two fields may have been fuzzier than their 
rhetoric claims them to be.” 
 
 Moreover, Cicero included jurists in his circle of friends, and his 
letters show him engaged in debating legal issues. Further, when it suited 
him, he was quite capable of striking a different note from that in pro 
Murena. A notable example may be found in his pro Caecina, in which 
Cicero's client sought the interdict de vi armata with respect to certain 
disputed land. At 77-79, Cicero is highly complimentary of the jurist Gaius 
Aquilius Gallus. The point loses only some of its force from the fact that he 
had given an opinion supportive of Cicero's position (that, on the strict 
wording of the interdict undi vi armata, contrasted with that of the 
interdict unde vi, it was not necessary to show dispossession). Given this, 
it is perhaps unfortunate that pro Caecina is, as far as appears, given only 
two brief mentions in the book under review. 
 All the same, Watson’s argument, based as it is on direct reference 
to Cicero’s own words, is a strong one. The book under review, though, is 
presented as a response to Watson’s characterisation of Cicero as an 
“outsider”. I have to say that, notwithstanding the high merits of the 
chapters in this book, I did not see anything in it that persuaded me that 
the view espoused by Watson was anything other than fundamentally 
sound. For example, stimulating though Philip Thomas' contribution was, 
it does not entirely appear to me that Cicero presents himself in pro 
Murena as belonging among the jurists he lampoons there. Nonetheless, 
there is much to provoke reflection here, which can only in the end be 
positive. 
 Space does not allow full discussion of all chapters. Suffice to say 
that they range widely - more widely indeed than the book's stated aim 
would suggest - and discuss numerous aspects of the relationship 
between forensic and juristic practice. It may be unfair to pick out only 
two, as all of the contributions justify close attention. However, I 
particularly enjoyed the contributions of Yasmina Benferhat and Matthijs 
Wibier, especially the latter's discussion of "conversions" from oratory to 
juristic study. That there could be such conversions is itself suggestive of 
a division in the Roman mind between the two. 
Finally, I did notice one minor typographical error. In an analysis of 
Cicero’s pro Caelio, Michael C Alexander identifies (at p. 198) a number of 
charges faced by Caelius, beginning with “assault on a senator sexually 
molesting women”. This should of course be two separate items, the 
omission of a comma after “senator” giving an unfortunate impression of 
the conduct of the senator in question. This, though, is a trivial complaint 
against a thoroughly enjoyable and thought-provoking book. It is always a 
pleasure to remake Cicero's acquaintance, and this book does not 
disappoint. 
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